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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DAVID MARK NEWTON WHEELER,
a minor child, by and
through his guardian ad
litem, MARK WAYNE WHEELER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

SUPREME COURT NO. 19730

vs.
STANLEY C. MANN,
Defendant and Appellant.
RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S
PETITION FOR REHEARING
INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered in
the Plaintiff-Respondent's ("Wheeler") favor requiring the
Defendant, Stanley C. Mann ("Mann") to repay the David Newton
Wheeler Trust ("Trust") all funds Mann received as trustee and
invested or loaned to companies he and his family owned and
controlled.

Mann lost the entire trust fund.

On September,

1983 the trial court entered a partial summary judgment
holding Mann liable for breaching his duty as trustee in the
principal amount of the trust plus interest from the date of
receipt, in the amount of $235,137.88 and attorneys' fees of
$8,000.00.

On March 7, 1984, Wheeler filed a motion to dismiss
this appeal on numerous procedural grounds including Mann's
failure to file a timely notice of appeal and a docketing
statementf to post a cost bond and to designate the record on
appeal.

This appeal was briefed by both parties and oral

argument was heard on February 10, 1987. On June 30, 1988,
the Court filed its opinion in this matter (the "Opinion").
In the Opinion the court declined to dispose of this case on
the procedural grounds raised by Wheeler, and instead,
affirmed the trial court's decision on the merits*

In

response to the opinion, Mann filed a pleading entitled
"Appellant's Opposition to Supreme Court Ruling Filed on June
30, 1988" (the "Opposition")/ which the Court has treated as a
Petition for Rehearing.

ARGUMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION
Mann makes three assignments of error in his

opposition.

The two assignments of error to which this

memorandum will respond are:
1.

The Court erred in finding that Mann had

failed to argue in the trial court that certain language
contained in the trust instrument authorized Mann's selfdealing investments and declining to consider that portion of
Mann's argument based on that language.
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2.

The Court erred by failing to appoint Gail

Taylorf instead of First Interstate Bank/ as successor Trustee
to Mann.

II.

THE COURT DOES NOT EVEN NEED TO CONSIDER MANN'S
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR.
The procedural defects in Mann's appeal alone prevent

the Court from needing to address Mann's assignments of error.
Mann failed to file a docketing statement and a designation of
the record on appeal and to post a cost bond.

As the court

stated in its opinion "the failure to file a cost bond/ a
docketing statement/ and a designation of record clearly
justifies dismissal." 86 Utah Av. Rep. 3/ (Sup.Ct. June 30/
1988) (citing Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin/ Wright
& Miles, 681 P.2d 1258/ 1264 (Utah 1984); R. Utah S. Ct. 9).
Thus, Mann's petition for Rehearing should be denied because
in any event/ Mann's appeal should have been dismissed.
Mann's appeal suffers from another fatal defect—Mann
never filed a notice of appeal.

The trial court entered

partial summary judgment in Wheeler's favor on September 139
1983.

An order granting partial summary judgment is not a

final appealable order.

South Shores Concession/ Inc. v.

State/ 600 P.2d 550, 557 (Utah 1979).
1983 order was not appealable.
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Thus the September 13,

On September 22, 1983, Mann filed a pleading entitled
Motion for Appeal.

The "Motion for Appeal" was neither served

on Wheeler's attorneys nor was it ever set for a hearing.

On

November 28, 1983, the Court entered an order declaring the
partial summary judgment to be the final judgment in this
case.

Mann did not thereafter file a notice of appeal.
Even if the "Motion for Appeal" could to be treated

as a notice of appeal, the Court should have dismissed this
appeal because a notice of appeal filed prior to entry of the
final appealable order is not sufficient to give the court
jurisdiction over an appeal of that final order.

See Acosta

v, Louisiana Dep't. of Health and Human Resources, 106 S.Ct.
2876, 2877-78 (1986).

Rather a notice of appeal must be

timely filed after the entry of the final order to invoke the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction.

Id.

Thus, the Court should

disregard Mann's Opposition and affirm the trial court by
dismissing this appeal.

III.

THERE IS NO BASIS FOR MANN'S FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF
ERROR
A.

The Court did not Err in Disregarding Mann's
Argument.

Mann argued on appeal that the trust instrument
expressly authorized him to invest in companies he managed and
controlled.

In support of that argument Mann cited the

following provision (the "Investment Provision'1):
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(g) the fiduciary may invest and reinvest
funds and other assets in such properties as
men of prudence, discretion and intelligence
purchase for their own accounts, having regard
not to speculation, but to the permanent
disposition of their funds and considering the
probable income as well as the probable safety
of their capital, including, but not by way of
limitation, common trust funds, shares and
obligations of the fiduciary and shares and
obligations of any affiliate, whether or not
of the character otherwise permitted by law
for the investment of funds of a fiduciary.
("Emphasis added")
In its opinion the Court stated that it declined to consider
Mann's argument based on the emphasized language because Mann
had not raised it below.

Mann now attempts to contradict the

Court's finding by attaching to the Opposition excerpts of the
transcript of the hearing on the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.

A review of those transcript excerpts reveals that

Mann quoted most of the language of the Investment Provision
but never indicated how or what language authorized him to
invest in corporations he owned and controlled.

Thus, the

courts refusal to consider the argument was justified.
B.

The Investment Provision did not Authorize
Mann's Self-Dealing Investments.

Even if Mann had raised the argument discussed above
at the trial level, this Court must affirm the trial court's
summary judgment.

When the existence of a written

instrument's provisions are clear and complete, the meaning of
the instrument's provisions can appropriately be resolved by
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the Court on summary judgment.

Morris v. Mountain States Tel.

& Tel. Co., 658 P.2d 1199, 1200 (Utah 1983).

In interpreting

the terms of a trust instrument, investment powers the Court
must strictly construe any terms authorizing investment and,
in the absence of an unequivocal grant of investment power
that exceeds statutory restrictions, the investment must be
deemed prohibited.

First Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Perkins, 275

Wis. 464, 82 NW.2d 33 (1957).
On appeal, Mann argued that the language of the
Investment provision permitting investment in "shares and
obligations of the fiduciary" constitutes an unequivocal grant
of authority that exceeds the self-dealing restrictions of
Utah Code Ann. Section 75-7-404(2) (1978).
meritless.

That argument, is

The language relied on by Mann clearly assumes

that the trustee is a corporation in which stock is issued, an
entity which acts through independent officers and directors
with their own fiduciary duties, and which could purchase its
own shares and obligations if such purchase was prudent and
non-speculative.
trustee.

Mann, however, is clearly not such a

He is an individual, not a corporation.

He lacks

the independent judgment, as was clearly evidenced in this
case to make prudent judgments about his own business
ventures. Thus, applying the strict rules governing the
construction of the Investment Provision, the court could have
concluded only that Mann's self-dealing investments were not
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permitted by the Investment provision and thus without prior
judicial authorization were prohibited by Utah Code Ann.
Section 75-7-404(2).
Mann admitted below that he never attempted to obtain
prior judicial authorization for the self-dealing stock
purchases.

The trial court's summary judgment must therefore

be affirmed.
C.

The Investment Provision is Void because it
Violates Public Policy"!

If the Court were to interpret the Investment
provision in the manner suggested by Mann, it would be void as
a violation of public policy.

Mann, relying on Dipo v. Dipo,

526 P.2d 923 (Utah 1974), argued on appeal that any trust
provision, even though violative of statute, must be
respected.

Mann's suggested interpretation of the Investment

Provision would permit him to have acted without the scrutiny
of any independent decision maker.

In In re Estate of

Wallich, 18 Utah 2d 240, 420 P.2d 40, 43 (1966), this court
held that a provision in a trust instrument authorizing the
trustee to act "without the necessity of making any accounting
to any person or party" was unenforceable because it was
against public policy where it would effectively permit the
trustee to "take property which rightfully belongs to
another."

Mann's suggested interpretation clearly contravenes

this Court's pronouncement of of public policy.

Thus, even if

the trial court had accepted Mann's interpretation, it would
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have been constrained to hold the Investment Provision
unenforceable.

The trial court's summary judgment therefore

must be affirmed.

D.

The Trial Court's Summary Judgment Must be Confirmed
Because Mann's Self-Dealing was Imprudent and
Speculative as a Matter of Law.
The trial court's inquiry in ruling on a motion for

summary judgment is whether there is a "genuine issue of fact"
remaining for trial Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S.Ct.
2505, 2510-12 (1986).

If the evidence on one side is

overwhelming, summary judgment must be granted as a matter of
law.

Id. at 106 S.Ct. at 2510-12. As discussed above, the

Investment Provision does not authorize self-dealing
investments of the kind Mann made without prior judicial
approval in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-404.

It is

undisputed that Mann did not obtan prior judicial approval.
Thus, the evidence is more than overwhelming, it is conclusive
that Mann's investments were prohibited by Utah Code Ann.
§ 75-7-404.
In addition to the statutory requirement that selfdealing investments be approved by the Court, the Investment
Provision clearly requires all investments, regardless of the
entity in which the investment is made, to be of the type that
"men of prudence, discretion and intelligence purchase of
their own accounts, having regard not to speculation, but to
permanent disposition of their funds and considering the
-8-

probably income as well as the probable safety" of the trust
assets.

This Court must uphold the trial court if the

evidence that was before the trial court overwhelmingly
demonstrates that Mann's investments were imprudent and
speculative.
Under the Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. standard
the trial court was compelled to grant summary judgment for
Wheeler.

Facts undisputed before the trial court that

demonstrate the imprudence and the speculative nature of
Mann's investments are as follows:
1.
At the time Mann transferred trust funds
to Western Marketing Resources between March
1979 and March 1980, it was suffering huge
operating losses* Its March 1979 financial
statement showed a $160,000 operating loss for
the year ending on March 31, 1979 and its
March 1980 financial statement showed a
$227,000 net operating loss for the year
ending March 31, 1981. See March 31, 1979 and
March 31, 1980 financial statements included
in Exhibit F to Wheeler's Memorandum Brief in
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
("Memorandum Brief"); Order dated December 22,
1981, Finding No* 8; Order dated January 18,
1983, Finding No. 1. At the time Mann
"investedH in Western Marketing Resources it
had no assets and heavy debts. See Id.
2.
The Western Marketing Resources stock
that Mann purchased was non-voting stock with
no express right to receive interest or
dividends. Exhibit E to Memorandum Brief.
3.
Western Marketing Resources had never
made a profit and it could never even pay Mann
a salary from the time of its organization in
1975 until it ceased to function in 1982.
Deposition of Stanley Mann, at p. 187 and
143-144.
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Investments in companies with heavy debt that are suffering
heavy losses and that present no prospect of dividend payment
are as a matter of law, speculative and imprudent. St.
Germaine's Admin, v. Tuttle, 114 Vt. 203, 44 A.2d 137 (1945).
Mann has presented no substantial evidence to contradict the
foregoing facts. Thus, the trial court's summary judgment
easily satisfies the Anderson v. Liberty Lobby standard and
must be affirmed with respect to the Western Marketing
Resources Investments.
The Quest Publishing, Inc. ("Quest")

"Investments"

are likewise, as a matter of law, imprudent and speculative.
Mann invested more than $80,000 in Quest immediately after the
company had been formed.

Exhibit I to Memorandum Brief, Mann

Depo at p. 77. Quest had no experience in publishing, no
contracts with any agent or publisher and no completed
manuscript.

Mann Depo at pp. 287-89. Moreover, the more than

$80,000 of trust funds purchased only a minority interest in
Quest, Mann Depo at p. 77. Mann, of course, owned the
majority interest but does not know how much he paid for that
interest. Mann Depo at p. 77. Again these admissions were
unrefuted by Mann in the court below, meaning that the court's
summary judgment with respect to the Quest Investment meets
the Anderson v. Liberty Lobby standard and must be upheld.
There is further undisputed evidence that both the
Western Marketing Resources and Quest Investments were
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speculative and imprudent.

To hide his "investment" in these

companies Mann "laundered" the trust funds through a Chicago
friend.

Mann Depo at p. 53.

Mann lied under oath about

having made "those investment."

Mann Depo at p. 31;

Transcript of Trial Court August 18f 1983, hearing on Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment at 37.

Mann destroyed the

records concerning the investment after he had lied under oath
about making those investments.

Mann Depo at p. 31.

It is

not necessary for men of prudence with regard to their
investments to launder money, to destroy records and to deny
the "investments" under oath.
be hidden.

A "prudent" investment need not

Mr. Mann did not nor can he justify his

investments.

Cinder the Anderson standard, the trial court was

amply justified in finding all of Mann's unauthorized, selfdealing investments inappropriate.

IV.

MANN HAS NO STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE TRIAL COURT'S
APPOINTMENT OF A SUBSTITUTE TRUSTEE.
Even if there were any merit to Mann's argument that

the trial court was required to appoint Gail H. Taylor as the
successor trustee, instead of First Interstate Bank, the Court
cannot consider the argument because Mann has no standing to
assert it.

Under Utah law only the beneficiary of a trust can

enforce the terms of the trust.
2d 351, 400 P.2d 758, 760 (1965).

See Child v. Hayward, 16 Utah
See also Restatement

(Second) of Trusts $ 200, Comment d (1959) (only persons who
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have an interest in the trust can maintain a suit to prevent
injury to their interest).

Mann clearly has no interest in

the trust that would permit him to complain about the
appointment of his successor.

He is not a beneficiary.

Moreoverf he was removed as executor of Joan Wheeler's will by
the Colorado courts and thus, can claim no interest as the
representative of the trustor.

The trial court's appointment

of First Interstate Bank as successor trustee must therefore
be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The Court should deny Mann's Petition for Rehearing.
Even if this Court's original opinion on the merits had not
been correct, the Court could and should have dismissed this
appeal on procedural grounds.
The Court's ruling on the merits, however, was
correct.

The Investment Provision as a matter of law did not

permit Mann to make self-dealing investments.

The Court could

not interpret the Investment provision to do so and even if it
did, it could not have enforced the Investment Provision
because to do so would have violated public policy.
The Investment Provision clearly limits all
investments of trust assets to prudent, non-speculative
investments.

The undisputed evidence before the Court below

was so overwhelming that there was no genuine issue of fact
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with respect to the speculative and imprudent nature of Mann's
investments.

Mann's self-dealing investments were as a matter

of law, imprudent and speculative*
The Court must deny Mann's petition for rehearing for
all the reasons stated above.

Mann has once again filed a

meritless pleading in this Court.

The waste of money to the

beneficiary and his guardian must finally stop.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s ^ S ^ Y

of

September,

1988.
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN

DG9/KRHP
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed in the
U.S. mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Respondent's Response to Appellant's Petition for
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Stanley C. Mann, Pro se.,
P. 0. Box 27317
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Pro se.
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